Firms are increasingly using technology to enable targeted, or "personalized" pricing strategies. In settings where prices are transparent to all consumers, however, there is the potential that inter-personal price di¤erences will be perceived as inherently unfair. In response, …rms may strategically obfuscate their prices so that direct interpersonal comparisons are more di¢ cult. In this article, we conduct an experimental analysis of strategic obfuscation in an environment in which price transparency varies exogenously and endogenously, and consumers are inherently inequity-averse. We …nd that obfuscating price information among buyers can be e¤ective in alleviating peer-induced fairness concerns, and increase the likelihood that price o¤ers are accepted. Sellers understand that buyers are inequity-averse, and that buyers are aware of the incentives present to obfuscate price o¤ers. As a result, equilibrium prices are higher when a …rm chooses to obfuscate prices, but they remain constrained by perceptions of distributional fairness between buyers and sellers.
Introduction
Despite advances in technology that facilitate "personalized pricing," a seller's ability to set prices according to each buyer's willingness to pay (WTP) is constrained by perceptions that the price charged is inherently unfair (Garbarino and perceptions that the buyer is receiving something additional for paying a higher price (Sahay 2012) .
In this study, we consider another potential means of overcoming perceptions of unfairness: Strategic obfuscation, or simply making it di¢ cult for buyers to form expecations of what constitutes a fair price.
Strategic obfuscation commonly refers to sellers either increasing the complexity of the pricing structure (Muir, Seim, and Vitorino 2013), tailoring prices for speci…c individuals, or creating di¤erent versions of the same product with the express purpose of preventing price-comparison (Ellison and Ellison 2009 ). For example, the "Your Secret Price" function o¤ered by Hotels.com to loyal customers is one means of creating personalized prices that others may not see, unless they happen to compare o-ine. Moreover, soft drink manufacturers o¤er dozens of variants of each sub-brand, often carried in slightly di¤erent multi-packs or container sizes speci…c to a single retailer. Without the ability to comparison shop, consumers pay more (Richards, et al. 2016 ).
If obfuscation is e¤ective at raising search costs, then it may also prevent buyers from comparing prices, and alleviate perceptions of price inequity. In this study, we examine the role of obfuscation in reducing interpersonal price-fairness concerns, and use a lab experiment to empirically determine the e¤ect of obfuscation on perceived fairness, purchase intentions, and equilibrium prices between buyers and sellers.
Consider another prominent example. Perhaps no other pricing system in our economy is more opaque, or customized pricing more prevalent, than in the airline industry (McAfee and Te Velde 2006). A common adage holds that if a passenger were to ask everyone else in his or her row what they each paid for their seat, no two answers would likely be the same. Flyers do not complain much about di¤erential pricing by airlines simply because they don't ask what others paid -asking is simply not common in our society, and airlines know and exploit that fact. What if there was a price tag displayed prominently above each seat? Would airlines price di¤erently? With full transparency, and inequity-averse buyers, we suspect they may.
Inequity aversion is likely to be an important reason why interpersonal price di¤erences matter.
Quite simply, economic agents, regardless of their role, are inherently averse to di¤erential treatment, or outcomes (Hat…eld, et al. 1978) . For example, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) use the concept of inequity aversion in an economic setting to explain why public good contributions tend to be much larger in reality than predicted by theory. Retail transactions, however, do not involve public goods. Ho and Su (2009) and Ho, Su, and Wu (2014) re…ne the concept of inequity aversion in a way that is more appropriate for commercial transactions by considering both distributional fairnessor concerns regarding how the total surplus to a transaction are divided between the buyer and seller -and peer-induced fairness, which captures how buyers feel about paying prices that di¤er from other buyers. Ho, Su, and Wu (2014) are able to disentangle the distributional fairness and peer-induced fairness e¤ects not only to understand how willing recipients are to accept di¤erential prices, but how their expected responses condition sub-game perfect equilibrium prices. In their model, however, the mechanism by which the price signal is transmitted among buyers is obscured by some unspeci…ed, exogenous event.
In reality, with inequity-averse buyers, the extent of price transparency is endogenous as sellers, in the wake of the ill-fated experiment by Amazon in 2000, fully understand how buyers feel and how they should respond optimally. Complete price transparency is likely to have a dramatic e¤ect on the equilibrium distribution of prices. Individualized prices for prescription insurance (Frank and Newhouse 2008) or add-ons to relatively standard items (Ellison 2005 ) not only raise search costs as in Ellison and Ellison (2009) , but they also obscure comparisons among peers who would otherwise be o¤ended by paying more than their peers in the same situation. In this sense, sellers may use strategic obfuscation to avoid fairness-based barriers to individual pricing, without the need to negotiate prices. 1 In this paper, we develop an empirical model that includes considerations of both distributional and peer-induced fairness on the buying-side, and endogenizes seller decisions regarding both the price to charge, and the decision to obfuscate. Ours di¤ers from previous empirical models of inequity aversion and price fairness (Ho and Su 2009; Ho, Su, and Wu 2014) by isolating the e¤ect of obfuscation as a means of overcoming consumer aversion, and how this may a¤ect equilibrium pricing outcomes.
We test the predictions of our conceptual model of strategic obfuscation using a two-sided experiment in which subjects play the role of either a price-discriminating seller, or a utility-maximizing buyer. We use a laboratory environment because it provides the ability to separate consumer fair-ness from other confounding e¤ects (reciprocity, betrayal, altruism, etc.) present in transactional data. In particular, buyers decide whether or not to accept the price o¤er made by the seller while the level of interpersonal price transparency is varied both exogenously, and endogenously. We model exogenous price obfuscation by allowing subjects to have complete knowledge of what others pay, a fuzzy signal of what others paid, or no information at all. Endogenous price obfuscation is examined by allowing the seller to pay to obscure prices between buyers, so both the level of obfuscation and prices are endogenously determined. We use an incentive compatible design so that the participants'actual monetary payment is directly proportional to the wealth they accumulated during the experiment.
We …nd that peer-induced fairness concerns are an important obstacle to charging personalized prices, but obfuscation can help sellers mitigate buyers' aversion to inequity, even when they are aware that the supplier is doing so. When we allow for endogenous behavior by sellers, our core hypothesis is supported, namely that prices are higher when obfuscation is used in a strategic way.
Although …nding that limits to transparency can lead to higher prices is to be expected in a model of active consumer search, it is less obvious that equilibrium prices can rise even when buyers are aware of the incentives faced by sellers.
We contribute to both the conceptual and empirical literatures on price fairness by introducing obfuscation as a means by which sellers ameliorate buyers'peer-induced concerns to implement a personalized pricing platforms. To this point, the literature on interpersonal perceptions of price fairness has taken price transparency as a given. However, in many settings sellers are able to utilize technologies that ensure prices are speci…cally targeted to individual buyers, or invest in product variants that make direct price comparisons more di¢ cult. We explicitly consider the e¤ect of these decisions on equilibrium prices. Further, while the mechanisms that underlie perceptions of price fairness are by now relatively well-understood (Xia, Monroe, and Cox 2004) , there is little research on how these perceptions manifest in purchase decisions, or in optimal seller responses, despite evidence that equilibrium prices are likely to be fundamentally di¤erent if rational sellers take into account the fact that inequity-averse buyers may not purchase if they think they are being taken advantage of (Anderson and Simester 2008; Rotemberg 2011) . Our …ndings on the decision to obfuscate add another level of realism to the conceptual fairness literature, and its practical importance. We also contribute to the empirical literature on price fairness. Our estimates of the importance of distributional and peer-induced fairness are obtained in an environment in which sellers can endogenously obfuscate prices. Estimating these e¤ects together removes an important element of bias that may have confounded previous estimates of the relative importance of each fairness concept in driving players'fairness perceptions, and purchase decisions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide some background on the concepts of obfuscation and fairness, and use this conceptual framework to develop hypotheses regarding the ability of …rms to mitigate adverse perceptions of price unfairness by limiting price transparency. We describe the experiments used to test these hypotheses in the third section, and summarize some of our preliminary …ndings. Our econometric approach to testing the hypotheses more formally is developed in a fourth section, while a …fth presents the estimation results and draws some implications for our primary …ndings on the value of strategic obfuscation.
Conceptual Background

Obfuscation
Ignorance as a source of market power has been well understood since Scitovsky (1950) . If …rms are able to make price-comparison di¢ cult or costly, they will be more likely to sell to buyers unwilling to search for the true price. However, our notion of strategic obfuscation is di¤erent. In Much of what we know about strategic obfuscation is based on settings in which …rms are able to vary the attributes of their product such that direct price comparisons are di¢ cult, or at least more costly (Ellison 2005; Gabaix and Laibson 2006) . 3 If …rms have the ability to "addon" features that raise the …nal price, but are not necessarily advertised, they can use these to price discriminate in a competitive environment (Ellison 2005) . Add-ons give rise to an adverse selection e¤ect: The additional pro…ts due to add-ons are not bid away because prices are pushed su¢ ciently far apart that the …rm attracts a large number of "cheapskates" to the base product, 2 Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) describe a more general form of obfuscation that can include both attribute and pricing obfuscation as special cases. They show that it is individually-rational for …rms to obfuscate in a competitive model of costly search and oligopolistic rivalry. 3 "Versioning" is a type of obfuscation through attribute variation in which the intent is to induce consumers to self-select into higher or lower-priced variants where the di¤erence is unrelated to cost (Varian 1997). and su¢ cient others willing to buy the add-on so that pro…ts are sustainable in a competitive equilibrium. However, competitors should still be able to reveal the nature of these add-ons and remove any pro…t opportunities. Nonetheless, Gabaix and Laibson (2006) show that when the market consists of a substantial number of naive buyers who are unaware of the add-on premium, add-ons can proliferate in equilibrium. Essentially, add-ons are a form of strategic obfuscation as they are intended to raise the e¤ective price of an item without a¤ecting the "shelf price" or the price that buyers initially see when searching across products. Because adding features to mass-produced buyer products is often not possible, these models describe a special case that is not typical of most retail markets. Moreover, empirically, strategic obfuscation through attribute complexity is di¢ cult to identify independent from mere di¤erentiation (Kalayci and Potters 2011).
Therefore, we focus on obfuscation through price transparency.
Prices are not transparent in many important markets. For example, Carlin (2009) studies price dispersion in …nancial markets. Using an oligopoly search model, he shows that prices rise in the complexity of the price structure, and interprets complexity as strategic obfuscation. Somewhat counter-intuitively, he shows that as the number of …rms grows, then the market does not necessarily become more competitive as the degree of complexity increases, and hence obfuscation, rises accordingly. The reason is straightforward: as more …rms enter, each …rm receives a smaller share of expert buyers. Therefore, their best response is to increase the level of complexity in order to increase rents from uninformed buyers when they do not "win" the expert buyers. Since each …rm has the same incentive to do so, the fraction of informed buyers falls as …rms enter -complexity tends to reduce competition more generally. Firms actively manage the level of obfuscation as the proportion of uninformed buyers is endogenously determined by the complexity choices made by the …rms. Further emphasizing the strategic nature of obfuscation, Wilson (2010) describes a theoretical model in which …rms are asymmetric, and use obfuscation in order to separate themselves from other …rms, which he terms "prominent" …rms, that choose to remain easily searchable and transparent. Agents with positive time costs …rst search the rival (prominent …rm), which raises its price, and softens competition for the customers that choose to search beyond the most immediately transparent …rm. The prominent …rm has no incentive to obfuscate because doing so reduces pro…ts to both …rms, so the pro…ts due to obfuscation are not bid away in a Nash equilibrium.
However, equilibrium prices are lower with obfuscation in his model, so he describes a di¤erent outcome than we have in mind here.
Others predict that complex pricing structures can lead to higher equilibrium prices. In fact, how prices are framed can a¤ect complexity (Spiegler 2006 ; Piccione and Spiegler 2012; Chioveanu and Zhou 2013), where price framing refers to how prices are presented to the buyer. Namely, prices and quantities may be stated in units of measure that make it di¢ cult to compare across products -interest rates quoted in various time units, or nutritional content of food products being speci…ed in various units of weight or volume. Chioveanu and Zhou (2013) …nd that, in equilibrium, …rms randomize their choice of price frame in order to reduce the elasticity of demand, and sustain positive pro…ts. Firms choose both frame di¤erentiation, and frame complexity, so there is 2 separate dimensions as to how obfuscation enters the model. Similarly, using the boundedrationality assumption of Spiegler (2006) , Piccione and Spiegler (2012) argue that when …rms compete in prices and complexity, prices will not fall to the competitive level, even when the products are homogenous. The same holds true in a service context as Muir, Seim, and Vitorino (2013) …nd empirical evidence that more complex pricing structures are responsible for higher search costs, greater price di¤erences among suppliers, and higher markups. Obfuscation in services such as this is common, but it is di¢ cult to disentangle what is horizontal di¤erentiation from complexity in pricing schedules. 4 Clear separation between complexity and di¤erentiation is perhaps best achieved in the lab.
For example, Kalayci and Potters (2011) induce subjects' preferences for an hypothetical good, so are able to hold willingness-to-pay constant while varying the complexity of the pricing terms.
Complexity is still described in terms of the number of attributes their subjects must consider in comparing products, but attributes do not a¤ect utility. Allowing complexity to vary randomly over a series of product choices is another alternative (Sitzia and Zizzo 2009) . Using this approach, Sitzia and Zizzo (2009) attempt to disentangle subjects'aversion to complexity from their sense of being exploited, and …nd no evidence of complexity aversion, and only weak evidence in support of their exploitation hypothesis. We also model obfuscation in a lab environment, but avoid confounding attribute and price complexity by o¤ering subjects fuzzy signals de…ned over prices only, with no variation in product attributes.
Nonetheless, these experiments do contribute to a growing body of literature that examines whether there is empirical support for strategic obfuscation -a literature that also includes inves- 
Fairness
Identifying the e¤ect of obfuscation as a barrier to price discrimination means controlling for how buyers regard the fairness of retail prices. Indeed, perhaps due to its fundamental importance to the viability of any pricing system, price fairness has assumed a prominent place in both economics Retail prices can evoke feelings of unfairness among buyers for a number of reasons. Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986a,b) argue that buyers are motivated by a sense of dual entitlement. Their theory maintains that buyers' perceptions of price fairness are governed by the notion that …rms are expected to earn a reference level of pro…t, and buyers expect to pay a reference price. If buyers believe that a price increase is driven by higher demand -a snowstorm raising the demand for shovels -then the price is more likely to be viewed as unfair than if it were driven by higher costs of selling shovels. While interpersonal notions of equity are implicit in the reference price in dual entitlement theory, equity theory (Adams 1965; Bagozzi 1975 ; Oliver and Swan 1989) makes such comparisons explicit as a basis for evaluating the fairness of a price. According to equity theory, the perception of a deal is guided by the reasoning that "...exchanges tend to be perceived as fair when the ratio of costs and bene…ts is the same for all participants..." ( Social norm theory explains why airline passengers do not appear to mind paying di¤erent prices from peers for nearly identical seats, while Amazon was forced to abandon their attempt to price DVDs the same way in 2000 . Regardless of social norms, buyers are more likely to be satis…ed with the price they paid if they feel they received a "good deal" (Darke and Dahl 2003) . Transaction utility theory (Thaler 1985) maintains that buyers obtain some bene…t simply from the perception that they paid less than their reference price -and reference prices can be established through interpersonal comparisons. In the context of discriminatory pricing, each of these theories would predict that price transparency -knowledge of what others paid -can lead to perceptions of inequity through any one of a number of mechanisms. In this research, we examine the implications of peer-induced fairness concerns on market outcomes, and consider how obfuscation can support a system of discriminatory pricing.
Central to any model of price fairness is the notion that buyers, either explicitly or implicitly, have some sort of reference price they use to assess whether or not a price is fair. Quite simply, fairness is not an absolute concept. Buyers form benchmarks, or reference prices, in a number of ways: By recalling previous transactions, observing competitor prices, from an understanding of seller costs, or by observing the prices paid by other shoppers (Briesch et al. 1997 ). Indeed, for products that are purchased infrequently, are su¢ ciently unique that there are no real competitors, or if the costs of production cannot plausibly be known, prices paid by others is a logical benchmark for evaluating how fair a retail price is ( we do not consider framing per se, but our method of inducing complexity is su¢ ciently general to admit framing as a special case of price-obfuscation.
Few studies link perceptions of price fairness to choice or market demand. Connecting fairness perceptions and demand is critical to understand whether a discriminatory pricing regime will succeed or fail. Among those who do consider this question, Anderson and Simester (2008) use a large-scale, choice-based, …eld experiment to study the question of why retailers do not o¤er premium prices for larger-size clothing, even when they typically pay wholesale premiums for plus sizes. They …nd that buyers of sizes that marginally qualify as "large" perceive premiums as unfair, and are less likely to buy as a result. Anderson and Simester (2010) …nd that customers react by making fewer subsequent purchases if they buy a product and later observe the same retailer selling it for less, attributing this e¤ect to buyer antagonism. Losing some customers, however, does not necessarily mean that discriminatory pricing is suboptimal as Courty and Pagliero (2010) …nd that price variation in response to temporal changes in demand at an internet cafe may antagonize customers, but, in fact, increases net demand as the elasticity of demand is inversely related to its level. If perceptions of price fairness a¤ect demand, then rational sellers should respond accordingly. Rotemberg (2011) , for example, argues that optimal pricing is constrained by considerations of fairness. Therefore, we incorporate both perceptions of fairness, and endogenous pricing, in our strategic obfuscation experiment.
Experiment Design and Procedure
To our knowledge, no previous study focuses on how a seller's strategic obfuscation decision e¤ects buyers'perceptions of price fairness and their subsequent purchase decision. Ho, Su, and Wu (2014) study how distributional and peer-induced fairness interact and in ‡uence economic outcomes in a supply chain. When both types of fairness concerns are present they …nd that peer-induced fairness concerns are more salient than distributional fairness concerns. However, they do not account for di¤erent peer-induced fairness responses from advantaged (low price) versus disadvantaged (high price) subjects, nor allow for the possibility that sellers may choose to obfuscate prices. Our experiment uses an interactive trading environment to observe buyers'fairness perceptions and the e¤ect strategic obfuscation has on equilibrium prices.
The market experiment consists of subjects who play the role of either a seller, who sets prices for a …ctitious good, and in some cases, makes an obfuscation decision, as well as buyers who decide whether to accept the price o¤er or not. Participants are randomly assigned to these roles at the beginning of the experiment and interact with each other over several periods in a two-sided, incentive-compatible environment. In particular, a single seller is randomly and anonymously matched every period with 2 di¤erent buyers using networked computers. 5 The random matching allows for the possibility that the same buyer-seller match occurs, however, anonymity is imposed so participants are not aware who they are matched with in any period. This anonymous matching is used to eliminate collusion, reciprocity, reputation e¤ects, and other dynamic strategic behavior The design includes three exogenous treatments where price transparency is …xed, and two endogenous treatments that provide sellers the opportunity to decide whether or not to obfuscate prices. Table 1 summarizes the …ve treatments. Under the exogenous treatments the price ob- 5 Participant interaction was facilitated using the ztree software which is the Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments (Fischbacher 2007). fuscation is: none (a buyer observes his own, and his peer's price o¤er), full obfuscation (a buyer only observes his own price o¤er), and partial obfuscation (a buyer observes a randomly generated price range around his peer's price o¤er 6 ). We endogenize the price obfuscation decision in separate treatments. In both treatments, if the seller does not pay the obfuscation cost the 2 buyers she is paired with have complete price transparency. Alternatively, the seller can choose to pay the added cost so the prices are fully obscured in treatment 4, or partially obfuscated in treatment 5 (analogous to the partial obfuscation used in treatment 3). Buyers are aware of the obfuscation decision made by the sellers. Together, the treatments are designed to elicit information on sellers' wealth allocation, and observe buying behavior under di¤erent price obfuscation scenarios. This will allow us to disentangle buyer's distributional and peer-induced fairness responses as well as observe whether buyers' reactions di¤er based on being in the advantageous or disadvantageous position. In each period, a seller sets two separate prices based on 2 di¤erent, random WTP draws from a uniform distribution with a minimum of $50EC (experiment credits) to $150EC. To avoid buyers making judgements about the likelihood they received the lower WTP relative to their peer, participants were not informed of the upper limit of WTP. A buyer observes his own WTP for that period, and the price the seller o¤ers. Depending on the treatment a buyer may or may not observe information about the prices o¤ered to the other buyer. Each buyer then decides whether or not to accept the price. If the o¤er is rejected, both the seller and buyer earn nothing. If the o¤er is accepted, the buyer obtains the di¤erence between his WTP and the price, while the seller keeps an amount equal to the price minus a …xed cost of $50EC. All subjects are aware of the seller's cost, so the amount of pro…t retained by the sellers is known. Once all buyers make their decision, a surplus / pro…t screen shows the amount each subject earns, and the accumulated earnings. This procedure, and its relationship to the treatment summary provided in table 1, is summarized in …gure 1. In order to motivate the participants to make thoughtful, realistic decisions during the experiment, an incentive-compatible design is used. Prior to starting we explained that subjects could earn an additional $0 -$10 based on their total pro…t / surplus at the end of the experiment (see Appendix A for additional details). 7 
Figure 1: Summary of Treatment Process and Design
We recruited 228 subjects ( 47 for each treatment) from a large Eastern University in the United States. Each of the 5 treatments were conducted in two sessions with 20 periods per session for a total of 3; 498 observed transactions. Of the subjects assigned to the seller role, nearly 50% had retail work experience. After the instructions were given, we conducted 2 practice rounds to familiarize participants with their role and the process. Prior to starting, subjects were asked privately (i.e. on their computer screen) if they understood, and encouraged to ask any remaining questions. All participants indicated that they did in fact understand. We feel con…dent that the participants recruited to take part in the study understood the experiment and made decisions consistent with a manager facing this same simpli…ed market scenario. For approximately 60 minutes, subjects traded for as many periods as possible. In order to avoid end-game behaviors, subjects were informed that the experiment would last for approximately 60 minutes, but did not know which period was the last until it was already over (Yuan, Gomez, and Rao 2013; Zwick and Chen 1999). This approach is preferable to a known …xed number of periods because it allows for the maximum number possible within the 60 minute time frame, and does not require that the last period be discarded.
In summary, when fairness concerns are present they reduce a buyer's utility and require the seller to compensate through lower prices, or o¤ering more surplus. If obfuscation is e¤ective at reducing fairness concerns then we will observe higher equilibrium prices as a result. In treatment 1 buyers only observe their own price so distributional fairness is present, but peer-induced fairness concerns will not play a role in the price o¤er's acceptance. Equilibrium prices in treatment 1, therefore, should be higher than treatment 2 since it has complete price transparency so both distributional and peer-induced fairness concerns are present. Buyers'peer-induced fairness reaction when a fuzzy price signal is observed in treatment 3 is an empirical question. Finally, in treatments 4 and 5, the seller has the option to obfuscate prices which allows her mitigate the two buyers'
peer-induced fairness concern. However, buyers are aware of the decision made by the seller and understand her incentive to obfuscate so their distributional fairness concerns may change as a result. By varying the degree of price obfuscation across treatments, our experiment is able to disentangle the e¤ects of distributional fairness, peer-induced fairness, and obfuscation on equilibrium prices. Because the net e¤ect depends on the relative importance of each form of fairness, the resolution is an empirical question, answerable only by controlling appropriately for all other, potentially confounding, in ‡uences.
Empirical Model of Peer-Induced Fairness
In this section, we describe the empirical model used to test for the relative importance of distributional and peer-induced fairness. Our model is similar to Ho and Su (2009), but we allow for strategic obfuscation, thereby endogenizing both the pricing and obfuscation decisions made by the seller. In addition, the model disaggregates peer-induced fairness concerns based on whether the buyer experiences advantageous inequity (receives a lower price quote), or disadvantageous inequity (receives a higher price o¤er) following Fehr and Schmidt (1999) .
The nature of the game played between sellers and buyers is relatively simple: In the …rst stage, a seller observes her two buyers'WTP and sets the prices (and decides on an obfuscation strategy in treatments 4 and 5). In the second stage, buyers observe their o¤ers (and perhaps the other buyer's price), and make a decision to accept or reject the transaction. The markets clear, and equilibrium pro…ts and surplus are realized. We describe the model by backward induction, from the buyers' decisions back to the seller's. We begin by describing the empirical model we use to estimate buyer behavior, and follow with the seller model.
Buyer-Response Model
Buyer utility is formed conditional on the …rst-stage decision made by the seller. In the second stage, buyers decide whether or not to make a purchase decision given the seller's price o¤er. Within the experiment a buyer's utility will depend on the di¤erence between his WTP for the item and the price o¤ered, or the amount of buyer surplus (CS j ). Utility also depends on the buyer's intrinsic concern for the total pro…t retained by the seller (DS j ), as well as the prices quoted to other buyers in either an advantageous inequality (AI) or disadvantageous inequality (DI) state. In our setting, the utility for buyer j is given by:
All of the parameters in equation (1) are allowed to vary by treatment, T , except the constant, 0 , which is …xed across all treatments. For ease of exposition we suppress the treatment subscript, T , hereafter. Buyer surplus is measured by: CS j = W j p j ; where W j is the exogenously-determined WTP, and p j is the seller's price o¤er to individual j. 8 The remaining variables in the consumer utility function capture subjects'response to concerns regarding distributional fairness, or peer-induced fairness. 9 Speci…cally, the total pro…t retained by the seller is de…ned as DS j = seller CS j ; or the di¤erence between the payo¤s the seller retains and the buyer receives (Ho and Su 2009). 10 If DS j > 0 the seller keeps a larger portion of the total available wealth than is o¤ered to the buyer. As DS j rises the price o¤ered to the buyer is more distributionally unfair. The seller's exogenous cost of selling, c, is …xed at $50EC, or the lower limit of the WTP distribution. With this de…nition, the coe¢ cient on DS j is given by , which 8 At the end of the experiment the buyers are compensated in real dollars based on their total accumulation of buyer surplus. 9 Demographic information was collected from the participants but did not have a statistically signi…cant e¤ect on the buyers'decision to accept the price o¤er.
1 0 Seller pro…t, seller , is the di¤erence between prices paid by the buyer and cost, c, if the buyer accepts the price o¤er.
captures the importance of distributional fairness to the buyer when deciding whether or not to accept the price o¤er, all else constant. Because the seller determines the allocation of wealth, her share is expected to always be positive, so the marginal utility associated with DS j is negative ( < 0) if buyers are concerned about distributional fairness.
We measure buyers' peer-induced fairness concern by de…ning advantageous inequity as the absolute value of the di¤erence between the price a buyer is asked to pay and what the other buyer's o¤er is, or: AI j = max( (p j p j ) ; 0) if j = L (i.e. the buyer received the lower price o¤er), and disadvantageous inequity is: DI j = max(0; p j p j ) if j = H (i.e. the buyer received the higher price o¤er). In equation (1) the parameter DI represents the marginal (dis)utility associated with disadvantageous inequity, and AI the marginal (dis)utility from advantageous inequity. By estimating separate parameters for advantageous and disadvantageous buyers, we test Fehr and Schmidt's (1999) hypothesis that concern for peer-induced fairness di¤ers across buyers (i.e. DI 6 = AI ).
In treatments 4 and 5, sellers have the option of obfuscating prices. In the absence of obfuscation buyers observe both their own price, p j , and the price of the other buyer, p j . However, buyers are aware of seller i's obfuscation decision, or lack thereof, so a binary variable, OB i ; is included whose parameter captures buyers' average response to the seller's obfuscation decision. Namely, if T < 0 the seller's decision to obfuscate the prices decreases the likelihood the buyer accepts the price o¤er, all else constant. When prices are obfuscated, buyers do not see the other's price, so AI = DI = 0. Removing the possibility of peer-induced fairness concerns across treatments, therefore, helps identify the e¤ect of pricing asymmetry on buyer behavior.
Recognizing that buyers may have heterogenous preferences and fairness concerns, we allow all the parameters in equation (1) to vary randomly over subjects. Each parameter is assumed to follow a normal distribution, where the mean of each parameter is interpreted as the average response across buyers, while the standard deviation captures the degree of response-heterogeneity.
Assuming that the stochastic demand component, " j , is Type I Extreme Value distributed, the demand model in equations (1) is estimated as a random coe¢ cient logit model using simulated maximum likelihood with 500 Halton draws.
Seller-Decision Model
Next, we estimate a model describing the sellers'behavior, both with respect to the o¤ered price and the decision to obfuscate, which captures their equilibrium response to expectations regarding buyer behavior. In the …rst decision-stage, sellers choose a price conditional on the exogenouslydrawn buyers'WTP, W j , and, in treatments 4 and 5, whether or not to obfuscate.
The equilibrium pricing decisions for the exogenous and endogenous-obfuscation treatments are written as:
o + j if T = 1; 2; or 3;
where p ijT is the price the i th seller quoted the j th buyer in treatment T . 11 We allow the parameters in equation (2) to vary by treatment, while the constant term, 0 , is …xed across treatments. The treatment subscript is suppressed hereafter. Each seller is paired with 2 buyers who have separate randomly drawn WTPs. We expect equilibrium prices to depend on the value of the random WTP draw for each buyer, W j , and whether the seller is setting the price for the advantageous, or lower WTP buyer. Because the seller faces two buyers, each potentially able to see the price o¤ered to the other, the seller has to anticipate that the buyers will respond di¤erently depending on whether they perceive themselves to be disadvantaged. In the pricing model, the dummy variable
if the buyer received a lower WTP relative to the other buyer. We expect 2T > 0 because sellers are more likely to o¤er the buyer with the lower WTP a smaller surplus relative to the buyer with the higher WTP. For example, if 1 were estimated to be 0.50 then sellers request a price that represents 50% of WTP, on average, while if 2 was estimated to be 0.10, sellers request the advantaged buyers pay 10% more than the disadvantaged buyers, on average.
In treatments 4 and 5 the seller has the option of paying a randomly-generated obfuscation cost in order to reduce, or eliminate, price transparency. We model the obfuscation decision as:
where OB i captures the seller's binary obfuscation decision as before, W H + W L is the total revenue the seller will obtain if both pricing o¤ers are accepted, W H W L captures the di¤erence between the two buyers'WTP draws, and g is the randomly generated cost of obfuscation. We expect the likelihood of obfuscation to rise in the total amount of revenue in the transaction, W H + W L , and in the di¤erence in WTP between the buyers, W H W L . The di¤erence in WTP measures the 1 1 To avoid any possible sample selection bias we use all the pricing observations set by the sellers, whether or not the price was accepted. The prices represent true-faith o¤ers that the sellers expect will be accepted as they cannot perfectly anticipate the buyers' reaction, a priori. We estimated the pricing equation conditional on only accepted prices and found the results were similar to those discussed below. potential severity of a peer-induced fairness response so the greater the di¤erence in WTP, the higher the potential value from obfuscation. We allow the parameters in (3) to vary by treatment, while the constant term, 0 , is …xed across treatments. We control for the endogeneity of OB i in the pricing equation using a control function approach (Garen 1984 It is important to re-iterate that our approach explicitly endogenizes seller behavior. Although our buyer model provides important insights regarding the e¤ect of di¤erential pricing on advantageous and disadvantageous inequity, and how both a¤ect purchase behavior, the complete story describes how sellers respond in deciding whether or not to obfuscate, and the equilibrium prices they o¤er the buyers.
Experiment Results
Descriptive Statistics
We begin by presenting some summary observations from the experimental data, and then move to the econometric estimates. Tables 2 and 3 provide the descriptive statistics from the experiment across the di¤erent treatments, which are summarized in table 1. When sellers know the buyers'WTP, they are able to increase pro…ts by price discriminating. However, when prices are transparent, sellers tend to o¤er less buyer surplus, W j p j , to the low price buyers (advantaged buyers), and made substantially higher pro…t as a result. Sellers understood that these buyers would be more likely to accept their o¤er relative to the disadvantaged buyers, so saw no need to o¤er more surplus. This …nding suggests that sellers not only had separate pricing strategies for the advantaged buyers compared to the disadvantaged buyers, but that transparency led sellers to compensate high-price buyers by o¤ering them more of the total surplus. Consistent with Muir, Seim, and Vitorino (2013) our results show a wider variation in price charged across high versus low price buyers, p H p L , when there is no price transparency compared to perfect price transparency.
Insert table 2 here
Summary observations of seller behavior also support the maintained hypothesis that strategic obfuscation may be pro…t-enhancing. In the …rst three treatments, we exogenously vary the level of obfuscation. In reality, …rms often have the ability to invest in obfuscation, either through making the structure of prices more complex, or adding slightly-di¤erent versions to the product line (Ellison and Wolitzky 2012) . We capture this behavior in treatments 4 and 5. The obfuscation-cost distribution was de…ned such that it is optimal to obfuscate about half of the time. 12 Table 3 shows that when sellers can obfuscate, the average price charged was raised and the buyer surplus o¤ered was diminished (i.e. treatments 2 v. 4, and treatments 3 v. 5). Finding larger equilibrium prices under obfuscation provides evidence that it is pro…t enhancing. In fact, if the cost of obfuscating is added back to the sellers'pro…t in treatments 4 and 5, the average earnings are higher compared to the same treatment under exogenous obfuscation. The summary statistics in table 3 suggest that buyers are more likely to make a purchase when the prices are obfuscated even though they knew the seller had intentionally, and strategically, reduced the price transparency. Overall, tables 2 and 3 provides model-free evidence in favor of our main hypothesis, but summary statistics alone cannot con…rm that obfuscation increases prices in general without controlling for other, potentially confounding factors. Therefore, we present estimates of the buyer-choice and seller-decision models in the following subsections.
Insert table 3 here
Econometric Estimates of Buyer Model
Recall that the dependent variable in the buyer model is a binary accept-or-no-accept variable.
Our estimates of the random coe¢ cient logit model used to describe the buyers'purchase decisions are provided in table 4. As a model of buyer choice, our estimates show how they respond to sellers'pricing and strategic obfuscation decisions, and the degree to which their distributional and peer-induced fairness concerns a¤ect the transaction. Further, by combining data from exogenous and endogenous obfuscation treatments, our …ndings show how sellers' expectations of buyer response a¤ect the equilibrium price and obfuscation outcomes. By separating out the treatment e¤ects from other confounding factors, we are able to cleanly identify the e¤ects of buyer surplus (CS), distributional fairness (DS), advantageous inequity (AI), disadvantageous inequity (DI), and strategic obfuscation (OB) on buyer acceptance.
Insert table 4 here
Distributional fairness is likely to be important to buyers if they think the pricing mechanism is inherently unfair, regardless of the prices o¤ered to others. In fact, we …nd that distributional fairness ( T ) has a statistically-signi…cant, negative e¤ect on the likelihood of accepting an o¤er, although the monetary impact is small. Namely, for every $10 di¤erence between seller and buyer payo¤s, the probability that a buyer accepts the o¤ered price decreases by 0:7 1:6%; depending on the treatment. As expected, buyers are most sensitive to distributional unfairness when prices are fully obfuscated. In this case, buyers do not know what others are asked to pay, so their concern with the pricing mechanism is concentrated on their relationship with the sellers. When buyers think they are being treated unfairly, but have no evidence to blame other buyers, the seller is targeted.
This …nding is purely a behavioral phenomenon as buyers'real monetary compensation depended on the total surplus accumulated. The concern with how much the seller retains was a purely intrinsic cost the buyers imposed on their decision. Nevertheless, our estimates are consistent with Ho and Su (2009) and suggest that buyer surplus has a much larger impact compared to distributional fairness on the likelihood of acceptance.
Next, we test whether buyers respond di¤erently depending on whether they were given the higher or lower price o¤er, relative to their peers. Consistent with Richards, Liaukonyte, and Streletskaya (2015), but in contrast to Fehr, and Schmidt (1999), our results show that perceptions of both advantageous and disadvantageous inequity are important determinants of buyers' acceptance decisions. The results show that under both the no price obfuscation, and partial price obfuscation treatments, advantageous inequality buyers are more likely to purchase ( AI;2 > 0; and AI;3 > 0). Consistent with transaction utility theory (Thaler 1985) , the perception of receiving the better deal relative to a peer provides an intrinsic utility. This, in turn, allows the seller to o¤er a smaller surplus and retain a larger pro…t, regardless of whether it was known with certainty (treatment 2), or uncertainty (treatment 3). In contrast to Ho and Su (2009) our results suggest that a buyer's peer-induced fairness response depends on whether he received a higher, or lower relative price o¤er.
Peer-induced fairness concerns reduce disadvantaged buyers'utility, ( DI;2 < 0), which decreases the likelihood a price o¤er is accepted when peers' prices are transparent. The results in table 4 show that, for a $10 di¤erence in the prices, the probability of acceptance for a disadvantaged buyer falls 1:1%. This …nding explains our summary statistics observation that sellers appear to provide a larger surplus to disadvantaged buyers in order to compensate for quoting them the higher price. In contrast, the high price buyers in the partial obfuscation treatment have considerably less concern about peer-induced fairness compared to the no obfuscation treatment ( DI;3 ' 0). 13 Consistent with Van den Steen (2004) , these estimates, in conjunction with the added pro…t sellers made in treatment 3, lend evidence that suggests when a buyer observes a randomly drawn price range for his peer's price o¤er, as opposed to the exact price (treatment 2), the buyer is overly optimistic about the probability he receives the better deal. 14 If more than half of the buyers perceive that they are in the advantageous position then sellers can charge increasingly higher prices since peerinduced fairness is not a signi…cant concern. Taken together, when the exact prices others paid is known, sellers have to o¤er a larger surplus to the disadvantaged buyers, but can capitalize on buyers'misconception that they obtained the better deal when prices are obfuscated.
A seller's decision to obfuscate has a signi…cant e¤ect on the likelihood a price o¤er is accepted.
In treatments 4 and 5 sellers had the option of paying a randomly-generated cost to either fully ( 4 ), or partially ( 5 ), obfuscate prices. On average, when sellers ensure that buyers cannot see what their peers paid, the likelihood of acceptance rises by 0:53%; even though the buyer is fully aware of the seller's decision ( 4 > 0). Because the e¤ect of partial obfuscation is not statistically di¤erent from zero, we conclude that sellers are better o¤ when prices are obfuscated, even if paying a reasonable cost to do so, because individuals'awareness of obfuscation is not a detriment to purchase and peer-induced fairness concerns are signi…cant for disadvantaged buyers.
Econometric Estimates of the Seller Model
The buyer response model …ndings suggest that sellers may have an opportunity to pro…tably-obfuscate prices among buyers, but whether they do depends on the empirical strength of their response to buyers' aversion to inequity. We address this question by estimating formal models of the sellers' pricing and obfuscation decisions given in equations (2) and (3), respectively. The estimated parameters provide insight into how the sellers change their pricing behavior based on the di¤erent WTPs they observed, while controlling for potentially confounding factors.
We …rst consider the decision to obfuscate provided in equation (3) . In this model, our maintained hypothesis is that sellers will be more likely to obfuscate the greater the total potential surplus in the transaction, W H + W L , and the larger is the di¤erence in WTP between the two buyers, W H W L . The estimates in table 5 support these hypotheses, both when the outcome is to fully obfuscate (treatment 4), or to partially obfuscate (treatment 5) prices. 15 In particular, each additional $10EC of potential total surplus, (W H + W L ), is associated with a 2:5% increase in the probability of obfuscating when prices are completely obscured (treatment 4), and a 1:7% probability increase when prices were partially obfuscated (treatment 5).
The results in table 5 also suggest that the marginal e¤ect of the di¤erence in WTP, (W H W L ), is at least 4 times larger than the e¤ect of total surplus (13% in treatment 4, and 6:6% 1 4 This has also been refered to as the self-serving bias (Miller and Ross 1975 ). 1 5 The parameter estimates are only applicable to Treatments 4 and 5 because these were the endogenous obfuscation Treatments wherein a seller made the obfuscation decision. in treatment 5). This …nding implies that sellers in our experiment respond rationally to the economic incentives they face -the expected bene…t of obfuscation increases as the value of price discrimination increases, or when perceptions of peer related price unfairness threaten an o¤er's acceptance. Sellers, therefore, are more likely to obfuscate when presented with the "guarantee" that price discrimination across buyers will not be revealed. Somewhat surprisingly, the cost of obfuscation is only signi…cant when presented with the option to fully-obfuscate (it was marginally signi…cant at the 11% signi…cance level for partial obfuscate). This result reinforces the importance of the promise that price-discrimination will be e¤ective through complete obfuscation.
Insert table 5 here
Next, we consider the pricing decision estimates in table 6a. In interpreting these parameters, it is important to keep in mind that the estimates represent equilibrium price responses. That is, the estimates describe sellers'pro…t-maximizing responses to their expectations as to how buyers will react in each case, including the buyers'response to the sellers'obfuscation decision. In this model, the marginal e¤ect of WTP on price depends not only on the absolute level of W j but also on whether the buyer received the lower WTP and will presumably be in the advantageous position when prices are set, denoted with D L = 1. Thus, the marginal e¤ect of WTP on price is 1 + 2 for advantageous buyers, and 1 for disadvantageous individuals. The estimates reported in table 6a largely support our primary hypothesis, namely that equilibrium prices are higher when sellers obfuscate compared to buyers observing their peer's price o¤er.
Insert table 6a here
In the exogenous obfuscation treatments 1 -3, the marginal e¤ect of obfuscation on prices is straightforward: for both the full and partial obfuscation treatments, sellers set higher prices for a given WTP compared to prices being fully transparent ( 11 > 12 and 13 > 12 ). The e¤ect is not as clear when the decision to obfuscate is endogenous. Comparing the four parameters estimated for treatments 4 and 5 (No Obfuscation versus Full or Partial Obfuscation) reveals no clear pattern upon …rst inspection. However, the estimated 1 parameters in the endogenous obfuscation treatments are interpreted as the pricing rule the seller uses, or how equilibrium prices vary with WTP. As table 6b illustrates, the median observed price under full or partial obfuscation is fully $10EC higher than under no obfuscation ($90 versus $80 in both treatments). This suggests that the implied marginal e¤ects are considerably higher under some form of obfuscation. In particular, obfuscating the buyers'peers'prices in treatments 4 and 5 added fully $12:21EC and $6:36EC, respectively, to the sellers'pro…t on average. Therefore, these estimates provide evidence that sellers understand the value of obfuscation and use it successfully to enhance pro…t.
Insert table 6b here
The results in table 6a also show that, as expected, the sellers set similar prices for both high and low price buyers in treatment 1, ( 21 ' 0), because prices were fully obfuscated so buyers did not know whether they received the higher or lower WTP. We …nd a similar result in treatment 3 which is not surprising given buyers'propensity to overestimate the likelihood they received the lower price from the seller (Van den Steen 2004) . Sellers, therefore, charge both groups a higher price and command a larger pro…t by capitalizing on this bias. Finally, in the no obfuscation environment (treatment 2) the seller exhibits individualized pricing across the low and high WTP buyers. Speci…cally, she sets prices at around 67% of WTP for the disadvantaged buyer, but asks an additional 5.4% from the buyer with the lower WTP, on average. As a result, in the absence of obfuscation the seller has to account for both distributional and peer-induced fairness by decreasing the price dispersion o¤ered to the two buyers, but commands a larger pro…t from those with the lower WTP.
Conclusion and Discussion
In this study we empirically determine how buyers respond to sellers strategically obfuscating price information while taking into account interpersonal price-comparisons and the perception of price fairness. According to Turow, Feldman, and Meltzer (2005) , some "...64% of American adults who have used the internet recently do not know it is legal for an online store to charge di¤erent people di¤erent prices at the same time of day..." (p. 3) and yet a strong majority believe that it should be illegal. Moreover, fully 91% of respondents disagree with the statement "...It's OK if the supermarket I use charges di¤erent people di¤erent prices for the same products during the same hour..." (p. 22) so clearly there is both a lack of knowledge regarding the nature of personalized pricing and aversion to di¤erent prices being charged across buyers.
We frame our analysis in terms of a conceptual model of inequity aversion, and examine how di¤erent obfuscation events a¤ect the perception of price fairness, and purchase probability. We test The …ndings suggest that obfuscating price information increases the likelihood that higher price o¤ers are accepted. We …nd that under both, exogenous and endogenous obfuscation equilibrium prices and pro…ts are higher. However, the pricing power under obfuscation is somewhat constrained by perceptions of distributional fairness between buyers and sellers, especially in situations where prices are fully obfuscated. In this case, buyers do not know what others are asked to pay, so their concern is concentrated on their relationship with the seller. Furthermore, our results imply that a buyer's knowledge of having received a better o¤er increases the likelihood that he accepts the o¤er, and allows the seller to retain a greater pro…t. In other words, sellers are able to price discriminate the lower priced consumer more e¤ectively and at the same time reduce the di¤erence in prices o¤ered to the buyers. In addition, when prices are less-than-transparent, buyers are more likely to be overly optimistic about the probability they received the lower price. Taken together, our …ndings suggest that price-discrimination, or personalized pricing regimes are likely to be more successful if sellers choose to obfuscate prices, whether by increasing the complexity of their pricing practices, or by changing the nature of the product or service customer-by-customer, so prices are not easily compared across buyers.
Firms are increasingly collecting and analyzing individual customer data that facilitates their ability to determine each buyer's willingness to pay not only for goods, but also the value buyers place on the attributes of the items and potential add-on products. However, a company's ability to charge individual buyers di¤erent prices based on his willingness to pay has been constrained by perceptions that the price charged is inherently unfair. Our results show that obfuscation provides a mechanism to successfully overcome these fairness concerns.
Our …ndings have a number of implications for managerial practice in a range of settings.
First, in online environments, where price discrimination is likely to be both more pro…table and technologically-feasible, price transparency will likely become a thing of the past as sellers realize the value in keeping "…rewalls" around their one-on-one deals with individual customers. Second, the practice of price discrimination, and obfuscation, is also likely to become more prominent in the public policy conversation as buyers begin to realize that they are paying more for relativelycommon items than they probably need to be. Third, greater complexity, both in product attributes and pricing structures, will become the rule for selling when prices are potentially-transparent. Easily sold as providing value through "customization" to …t speci…c needs, complexity and obfuscation are two sides of the same coin. The buyers'willingness to pay randomly drawn from Uniform [50, 150] . 1 Mean (standard deviation) of the average pro…t made each period. 2 Proportion of transactions that were accepted by the buyers. 3 Mean (standard deviation) of the price the seller requested. 4 Mean (standard deviation) of the buyer surplus the sellers o¤ered. 5 Mean (standard deviation) of the absolute di¤erence between prices o¤ered to buyer 1 vs. 2. The buyers'willingness to pay randomly drawn from Uniform [50, 150] . 1 Mean (standard deviation) of the average pro…t made each period. 2 Proportion of transactions that were accepted by the buyers. 3 Mean (standard deviation) of the price the retailer requested. 4 Mean (standard deviation) of the buyer surplus the sellers o¤ered. 5 Mean (standard deviation) of the absolute di¤erence between prices o¤ered to buyer 1 versus 2. 6 Mean (standard deviation) of the obfuscation cost the sellers incurred. 7 Proportion of transaction wherein the seller obscured the prices from the consumers. 
A Experiment Instructions Given to Subjects
Please do not use the computers in front of you until instructed to do so. While we wait for all the participants to arrive feel free to use your cell phone or talk with your neighbor. However, once the experiment starts we ask that you do not use your cell phones and refrain from talking with the other participants. As promised, you will receive at least $20 for coming to the experiment and will have the chance to earn an additional $10. The way in which you can earn the additional $10 will be explained in a moment. Taking part in this study is completely voluntary and you are free to withdrawal at any time. Since we are paying you a signi…cant amount of money, we expect that you will take the decisions that you make throughout the experiment seriously. This experiment is designed to simulate a retail environment. Two-thirds of you will be assigned to a buyer role that will represent someone making purchases at a grocery store, for example, and the other third will be sellers who will make pricing decisions similar to those made by a seller. You will remain in these roles throughout the duration of the experiment. Each period a seller will be randomly matched with 2 anonymous buyers. The three market participants (1 seller + 2 buyers) will change every period.
The sellers will be selling a …ctitious product. The cost the sellers incur for selling the …ctitious product is $50EC, or experimental dollars, and this will remain constant throughout the entire experiment. Each seller will set 2 di¤erent prices for each buyer based on the buyer's randomly generated willingness to pay each round. In case anyone is not familiar with the term 'willingness to pay'it represents the maximum amount of money a person is willing to pay for an item. Once all the sellers have made their pricing decisions it will be the buyers turn. Buyers will decide whether to accept or reject the price the seller set.
Everyone will then accumulate wealth throughout each round, and the total amount accumulated at the end of the experiment will dictate how much of the added $10 you will earn. The way that buyers accumulate wealth is the di¤erence between the willingness to pay that period, and the price the seller set. Sellers, on the other hand, accumulate wealth as the di¤erence between the price charged and the cost of selling, which is $50EC. As a result, buyers accumulate more each period if the price charged is lower, whereas sellers accumulate more if the price charged is higher. However, a transaction only takes place if the buyer(s) accept the price. If the buyers reject the price the seller set then the transaction does not take place and neither the buyer nor the seller accumulate any wealth that period. This is similar in spirit to a seller setting a price that is more than a buyer is willing to pay so the buyer opts to not purchase the item. After all the buyers have made their decision, a screen will be shown telling you how much you earned that period, and the total you've earned up to that point. We want to emphasize that the proportion of the $10 bonus you earn is directly related to the total wealth you accumulate throughout the experiment. So, you want to earn as much as possible each period to increase the chances of obtaining the full $10 bonus.
In summary, buyer's willingness to pay will change randomly each period. Sellers will see the new willingness to pay for both buyers he/she is randomly matched with and set prices for each. Buyers will then decide whether to accept or reject the price o¤ers. Earnings will be calculated and shown. We will then move on to the next period and this process will repeat itself until our hour is up (but was stopped 5 minutes before the hour to allow time for the participants to complete a brief demographic questionnaire).
At this time, we kindly ask that you take your cell phones out and place them on the desk. If there are no questions, then we will go through 2 practice rounds. These practice rounds will not a¤ect your total wealth at the end of the experiment. After the practice rounds are over you will have another opportunity to ask any remaining questions prior to the experiment starting. Once the experiment starts it is imperative that you do not use your cell phones nor talk with your neighbors. If you have a question, or an issue arrises, please raise your hand and one of our sta¤ will come around to help you.
The instructions above were common across all treatments. The instructions below were treatment speci…c.
A.1 Treatment 1 -Full Obfuscation
No additional instructions were needed.
A.2 Treatment 2 -No Obfuscation
After the seller chooses individual prices for buyer 1 and buyer 2, each buyer will see the price quoted for oneself and the price o¤er made to the other buyer as well. For example, the screen may show that you were o¤ered the price of $90EC and the other buyer was o¤ered $100EC for the same exact product.
The buyer will then decide whether his/her transaction should take place by accepting or rejecting his/her price o¤er.
A.3 Treatment 3 -Partial Obfuscation
After the seller chooses individual prices for buyer 1 and buyer 2, each buyer will see the price quoted for oneself and a range of prices the other buyer's price quote falls in. The other buyer's price has an equal chance of being anywhere inside the quoted price range. For example, the screen may show that you were o¤ered a price of $90EC and the other buyer was o¤ered a price that falls into the range of $70EC $80EC for the same exact product. The size of the price range is randomly determined and will change each period.
A.4 Treatment 4 -Endogenous Full Obfuscation & Obfuscation Decision
The seller will set prices for both buyers and have the option of paying an added cost to avoid the buyers seeing their peer's price o¤er. Namely, if the seller chooses to pay the additional cost a buyer will only see the price o¤er made to him/her speci…cally (and will not know the price the other buyer was o¤ered). On the other hand, if the seller declines to pay the additional cost, then each buyer will see the price quoted for oneself and the price o¤er the seller made to the other buyer as well. For example, the screen may show that you were o¤ered the price of $90EC and the other buyer was o¤ered $100EC for the same exact product. The seller's added cost will be randomly determined each period to be between $5EC and $15EC.
The buyer will then decide whether his/her transaction should take place by accepting or rejecting his/her price o¤er given the information available to him/her based on the seller's decision.
We will now do 2 practice rounds that will not a¤ect your total pro…t at the end of the experiment. When we go through the …rst practice round the buyers will see the pricing information of their own and their peer's o¤er -as if the seller had decided not to pay the added cost. In the second practice round the buyers will only see their own price -as if the seller had paid the added cost. The seller's actual price transparency choice will not a¤ect these …rst two practice rounds. We speci…cally designed these practice rounds this way so buyers are aware of what both screens look like so they know if the sellers are purposely removing the other buyer's price o¤er (and incurring the added cost), or not. Once the practice rounds are over the sellers'price transparency decisions will dictate whether or not a buyer observes his/her peer's price o¤er in addition to his/her own.
A.5 Treatment 5 -Endogenous Partial Obfuscation & Obfuscation Decision
The seller will set prices for both buyers and have the option of paying an added cost to avoid the buyers seeing their peer's exact price o¤er. Namely, if the seller chooses to pay the additional cost a buyer will see a range of prices the other buyer's price quote is in. The other buyer's price has an equal chance of being anywhere inside the price range, so it is not necessarily at the midpoint. For example, the screen may show that you were o¤ered a price of $90EC and the other buyer was o¤ered a price that falls into the range of $70EC $80EC for the same exact product. The seller's added cost will be randomly determined each period to be between $5EC and $15EC.
If the seller declines to pay the additional cost, then each buyer will see the price quoted for oneself and the price o¤er the seller made to the other buyer as well. For example, the screen may show that you were o¤ered the price of $90EC and the other buyer was o¤ered $100EC for the same product.
We will now do 2 practice rounds that will not a¤ect your total pro…t at the end of the experiment. When we go through the …rst practice round the buyers will see the pricing information of their own and their peer's o¤er -as if the seller had decided not to pay the added cost. In the second practice round, the buyers will see their own price and a range in which their peer's price o¤er is in -as if the seller had paid the added cost. The seller's actual price transparency choice will not a¤ect these …rst two practice rounds. We speci…cally designed these practice rounds this way so buyers are aware of what both screens look like so they know if the sellers are purposely removing the other buyer's price o¤er (and incurring the added cost), or not. Once the practice rounds are over the sellers'price transparency decisions will dictate whether or not a buyer observes his/her peer's price o¤er in addition to his/her own.
